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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Unless the transactions are taxed in the donors' estates, the use of
reciprocal trusts allows a taxpayer to rid his estate of assets at gift
tax rates and at the same time receive valuable lifetime economic powers
in return.31 This coupled with the fact that he has, at the same time,
given identical economic benefits to a member of his family, who also
escapes estate taxation, should justify remedial legislation.
3 2
The Third Circuit has recognized that the actual consideration test
applied in that court is substantially different from the so-called inferred
consideration test. It has suggested that the situation could be cured
by legislation which would treat these transfers as a single joint trans-
action and thereby regard each of the settlors as a pro tanto transferor
of the res over which he has control.33 It is submitted that this statu-
tory solution would be an equitable one in that the inherent nature of
the normal family relationship is one of interdependence and concert of
action.
3 4
HERBERT S. FALK, JR.
Gift and Inheritance Taxation of Community Property by Common
Law States
Generally, when a transfer of property occurs by gift or upon the
death of an individual, its taxability depends upon the policy within the
taxing jurisdiction and upon the extent of the interest transferred.
Granting that the problem of determining the extent of the interest trans-
ferred is often a difficult one, it becomes more complex when community
property is transferred by a husband to his wife due to the prior interest
of the wife which must be taken into account. It is a novel situation
when this problem arises within a common law jurisdiction, and several
recent decisions merit analysis.
The problem, as it relates to gift taxation, recently confronted the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Commonwealth v. Terjen.1 A
" See Phillips v. Gnichtel, 27 F. 2d 662 (3d Cir. 1928), cert. denied 278 U. S.
636 (1929), where the taxpayer argued that reciprocal trusts which were in con-
templation of death should be treated as a bona fide sale. See also Estate of
Scholler v. Commissioner, 44 B. T. A. 235 (1940).
" See Technical Changes Act of 1949, 63 STAT. 893 § 6 (1949), where Congress
impliedly approved the "judicial fiction" of the Lehmalp case by allowing, for a
limited time, a tax free rescission of reciprocal trusts.
" Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F. 2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1953). It
would seem that the legislation would be more equitable if it established a con-
clusive presumption of consideration when the trusts with crossed powers are
created by members of one family within two years of each other. If the second
trust is established more than two years after the first, the commissioner should be
required to prove that each trust was in consideration of the other. Thus, the
taxpayers would have a certain amount of freedom in disposing of their property.
"' See in general Notes, 42 CALiF. L. REv. 151 (1954) and 38 A. L. R. 2d 522
(1954).
1 Va. -, 90 S. E. 2d 801 (1956).
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husband and wife, while domiciled in California, acquired a substantial
amount of community personal property under the laws of California.
2
After moving to Virginia, they used a portion of the community funds
to pay for a home located in Virginia, title to which was taken in the
name of the wife. The Virginia Department of Taxation assessed the
husband with a gift tax based upon the full value of the property.3 The
husband contested this assessment on the theory that his wife had a one-
half vested interest in the community funds; that this interest was not
divested by their change of domicile; and that therefore he should be
assessed only for the transfer of his one-half interest in the property. It
was held that the husband was taxable for the full value of the property.
While the court agreed that the character of community property is not
affected by a change of domicile,4 it took the position that a wife does
not have a vested interest in community property under the laws of Cali-
fornia, and that this transfer of community funds from the husband to
his wife constituted a gift of the full value of the property.5
In contrast to this Virginia decision is a 1954 opinion of the Attorney
General of North Carolina, 6 in which an opposite conclusion was reached
upon identical facts. A husband and wife moved from California to
North Carolina, purchased a home in North Carolina with community
funds, and placed the title in the name of the wife. The Attorney Gen-
eral stated that the husband thereby made a gift of one-half of the pur-
chase price of the home and thus was liable for a gift tax7 only on that
one-half value. This result was founded on the theory that in California
the interests of the husband and wife in community property are "pres-
-Sections 162 and 163 of the California Civil Code define separate property of
each sponse as "All property owned by the [spouse] before marriage, and that
acquired afterwards by gift, bequest, devise or descent, with the rents, issues, and
profits thereof. . . ." CAL. Cim. CODE ANN. (West 1954). Section 164 then de-
fines community property as "All other property acquired after marriage by either
husband or wife, or both, including real property situated in this State and per-
sonal property wherever situated, heretofore or hereafter acquired while domiciled
elsewhere, which would not have been the separate property of either if acquired
while domiciled in this state. . . ." Ibid.
For applicable gift tax statutes, see VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 58-218, 58-219, and
58-223 (1950).
'The general rule is that "a change of domicile from a state where the com-
munity property law prevails to a common law state does not affect the community
character of property previously acquired. The law of the state to which the
parties remove will regulate their future conduct and acquisitions, but the removal
will not alter the rights of either to property then in possession, the title to which
had vested under the community property law." 11 Am. JuR., Comnunity Prop-
erty § 16 (1937). See also 92 A. L. R. 1352 (1934).
' See the discussion of the court, Commonwealth v. Terjen, - Va. -, 90 S. E.
2d 801, 802-804 (1956).
'Op. N. C. Atty. Gen., C C H INn., EsT. & GirFr TAX REP. 18,156 (Feb-
ruary 23, 1954).
For applicable gift tax statutes, see N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-188 through 105-
191 (1950).
19561
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ent, existing and equal," 8 and that the wife's interest is a "present vested
right."9
As it relates to inheritance taxation, this problem was recently con-
sidered in an opinion of the Attorney General of Maryland 0 and in a
decision of the Supreme Court of Montana."
The Maryland opinion involved community property acquired by
the husband and wife while domiciled in Texas.12  They moved to
Maryland, where the husband later died leaving all his property (after
a few specific bequests) to his surviving wife. Based on the conclusion
that the wife has a present vested interest in one-half of Texas commu-
nity property,'3 the Attorney General was of the opinion that (1) com-
munity property acquired in Texas, the character of which had never
changed, should be taxed14 only on the one-half interest of the husband
passing to the wife; (2) property acquired in Maryland with community
funds, title to which was in the husband alone, should be taxed at its full
value;15 and (3) property acquired in Maryland, to which there is no
evidence of record title, should be taxed at one-half value if purchased
with community funds.
16
In the Montana case, In re Hunter's Estate,'7 the husband and wife
acquired community property while domiciled in California. Although
they never left that state, the husband purchased in his name with com-
munity funds both personal and real property located in Montana. The
' Op. N. C. Atty. Gen., supra note 6, at 90,209.
Ibid. The Attorney General also states: "Had the title been taken in the
name of the hubsand the transaction would have been a gift of one-half the original
price by the wife to the husband, unless the circumstances were such as to give
rise to a presumption that the property was to be held in trust for the wife." Ibid.
As an example of such a resulting trust, see Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314 (1848),
where, after a divorce, the wife had the court impose a trust as to one-half of
property which had ben purchased in the husband's name with community funds.
20 Op. Md. Atty. Gen., C C H INN. EsT. & GIFT TAX REP. 18,385 (May 27,
1955).
In re Hunter's Estate 125 Mont. 315, 236 P. 2d 94 (1951).
1_-Community property in Texas is defined as "All property acquired by either
the husband or wife during marriage, except that which is the separate property of
either .... TEX. CIVIL STAT. ANN. art. 4619, § 1 (Vernon 1951).
13 In Texas the rights of the husband and wife are considered equal, and each is
considered as having a vested beneficial interest in the community. When legal
title is in the husband, the wife's interest is equitable but vested. Davis v. Davis,
186 S. W. 775 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916); Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 108 Tex. 555,
195 S. W. 1139 (1917).
1 For the applicable inheritance tax statutes, see MD. CODE ANN. art. 81, §§ 148,
150 (1951).
"' The Attorney General thought that, as a practical matter, the Register of
Wills should not be required to look beyond record title to determine the owner-
ship of such property. Op. Md. Atty. Gen., C C H INN. EsT. & GIrT TAX REm.
18,385 at 90,728-90,729 (May 27, 1955).
"* "This conclusion is supported by those opinions in which an implied exemp-
tion from the inheritance tax was allowed by reason of the fact that an adequate
consideration was paid by the recipient of the property for his interest." Id. at
90,729.
" 125 Mont. 315, 236 P. 2d 94 (1951).
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husband died in California, leaving all the Montana property to his wife.
The Montana court imposed an inheritance tax'8 on the full value of the
property on the theory that the privileges of the wife in California com-
munity property were not yet those of ownership as to give the wife a
vested interest sufficient "to overcome the presumption that title is where
the record puts it."'3.
Thus, it is seen from a discussion of decisions in four states that
their determination of the extent of interest transferred depended pri-
marily upon whether the wife had a "vested interest" in one-half of the
community property. Each decision assumed that if the wife had such
an interest only the husband's half could be made the subject of a "trans-
fer," and in order to determine the nature of her interest each looked to
the laws of the state where the property was originally acquired. Fur-
thermore, each decision seems to have hinged its tax results on whether
the mere label of "vested" had been affixed, without analyzing the prop-
erty rights of the wife to determine whether, regardless of the label, a
sufficient interest nevertheless did pass beneficially to her as a result of
the transfer.20 And in determining whether or not such label had been
attached to the interest of the wife in California North Carolina differed
from Virginia and Montana.
The first question arises in connection with the dispute whether or
not the wife's interest in California has been labeled as "vested." To
determine which decision or decisions stated the correct view it will be
necessary to look at California law.
Prior to 1927, it was clearly established that the wife's interest had
never been regarded as a "vested" interest.2 1 Because of this, in 1926
" For the applicable inheritance tax statute, see MONT. REV. CODE § 91-4401
(1947)."0 Iii re Hunter's Estate, 125 Mont. 315, 324, 236 P. 2d 94, 99 (1951).
"0 This is not to say that the decisions ignored the rights of the wife in their
discussions. Actually, the Virginia, Maryland and Montana decisions discussed
many aspects of the rights of the wife in community property. But due to their
concern over whether the community property state had merely designated the
wife's interest as "vested," the decisions left the impression that what was impor-
tant in determining the extent of the wife's interest was not the extent of her sub-
stantive rights but whether such rights had ever been labeled as "vested." From
the nature of their discussions, it is very likely that, even if the wife had no prop-
erty rights whatsoever in California community property, Virginia and Montana
would nevertheless have taxed the transfers only at one-half value, if they could
have determined that California courts had ever labeled the interest of the wife as"vested."
"1 As early as 1860, it was established that the wife's interest in California com-
munity property was a "mere expectancy, like the interest which an heir may
possess in the property of his ancestor." Van Maren v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 308, 312
(1860). In 1896, the Supreme Court of California said that the wife had no right
or title of any kind in the property, and had at most a "possible interest in what-
ever remains upon dissolution of the community otherwise than by her own death."
In re Burdick, 112 Cal. 387, 393, 44 Pac. 734, 735 (1896). Twelve years later, in
1908, the court held that since the wife, upon the death of the husband, takes a
one-half interest as heir, her interest is subject to inheritance taxes. Estate of
1956]
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the United States Supreme Court ruled that the husband and wife in
California could not submit separate returns in reporting income from
community property for federal income tax purposes. 22 At the next
session of the California legislature, in 1927, a statute was passed defin-
ing the interests of the husband and wife as "present, existing and equal
... under the management and control of the husband .... ," ;2 and in
1931, the United States Supreme Court interpreted this statute to indi-
cate that the wife now had a "vested" interest in the community property,
and could file a separate return for her interest in community income.
2 4
The fact remains, however, that the California legislature did not use
the label "vested" in defining the wife's interest in the 1927 statute. The
question of whether that result was intended by implication has never
been presented to the Supreme Court of California, though in 1941 that
court, by way of dictum, stated that "section 161a of the Civil Code does
not change the nature of the wife's interest to a vested one .... ,,2" And
Moffitt, 153 Cal. 359, 95 Pac. 653 (1908). This decision was overturned by the
legislature, however, in 1917, when a statute was passed exempting the wife's in-
terest from such taxation. CAL. STAT. 1917, p. 881. The statute today is CAL.
REVENUE AND TAXATION CODE ANN. § 13551(b) (Deering 1952). This latter
statute reads: "Upon the death of the husband: ... (b) The one-half of the com-
munity property which belongs and goes to the surviving wife pursuant to Section
201 of the Probate Code is not subject to this part." Interpreting this statute in
1926, the court stated that it did not operate to create a "vested" interest in the
wife, but that nevertheless she did now possess more interest than an ordinary heir.
Stewart v. Stewart, 199 Cal. 318, 340, 342, 249 Pac. 197, 206, 207 (1926). Other
rights which the wife had acquired at the time of this decision were the right to
join in conveyances of real property for periods longer than one year, the right to
secure a division of the community property without dissolving the marital relation
when she had cause for divorce, and the right to dispose of one-half of the com-
munity property by will. However, the California courts had not labeled her
bundle of rights as "vested." See Simmons, The Interest of a Wife in California
Community Property, 22 CALIF. L. REV. 404, 407, 409-410 (1934).
" United States v. Robbins, 269 U. S. 315 (1926).
CAL. CIVIL CODE ANN. § 161a (West 1954). This section further states:
"This section shall be construed as defining the respective interests and rights of
husband and wife in community property."
2 United States v. Malcolm, 282 U. S. 792 (1931). This privilege had already
been extended to the community property states of Washington, Arizona, Texas
and Louisiana. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101 (1930) ; Goodall v. Kock, 282 U. S.
118 (1930); Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U. S. 122 (1930); Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U. S.
127 (1930). It should be noted that the federal courts also recognized the wife's
interest as "vested" after the 1927 California statute in the field of estate taxation.
As to property acquired prior to 1927, the entire value of the community property
was includible in the estate of the decedent who acquired the property. Rule v.
United States, 63 F. Supp. 351 (Ct. Cl. 1945) ; Sampson v. Welch, 23 F. Supp. 271
(S. D. Cal. 1938). But as to property acquired after 1927, community property
was includible in the estate of the decedent only to the extent of one-half of its
value, if under the law of the state the wife had a vested interest in her half. Lang
v. Commissioner, 304 U. S. 264 (1938); Rickenberg v. Commissioner, 177 F. 2d
114 (9th Cir. 1949).
25 Grolemund v. Cafferata, 17 Cal. 2d 679, 686, 111 P. 2d 641, 644 (1941). This
statement was important to the decision, however, since the court actually held that




intermediate appellate courts in California have interpreted the statute
in the same manner.
26
Thus, it appears that the Virginia and Montana decisions arrived at
the correct conclusion as to the nature of the wife's interest in California,
as interpreted by the California legislature and courts.
27
Therefore, putting the North Carolina decision aside, the other deci-
sions (Virginia, Montana and Maryland) show this distinction: since
the wife's interest in California has not been labeled as "vested," the
full value of the property transferred to the wife was taxed by Virginia
and Montana, but since the wife's interest in Texas has been so labeled,
28
only the value of the husband's one-half interest passing to the wife was
taxed by Maryland. In view of the differing tax consequences in those
decisions, the second and more important question arises: Is the label
"vested" a valid criterion for determining the extent of the interest
transferred? To answer this question it is necessary to compare the
substantive rights of the wife in each state involved in the decisions,
California and Texas.
For purposes of clarification, in comparing the substantive rights of
the wife in each state, it will be helpful to consider first their similarities.
In each state the wife has the right to dispose of her one-half interest by
will,29 the right to take one-half of the community property free of in-
heritance taxes when the husband predeceases her,3 0 and the right to a
distribution of the community property upon divorce.31  She does not
" The intermediate appellate court interpretations were made incident to holdings
that community property cannot be attached by a trustee in bankruptcy for the
benefit of the wife's judgment creditors, Smedberg v. Bevilockway, 10 Cal. App.
2d 578, 46 P. 2d 820 (1935), nor applied by a judgment of the court to satisfy a
married daughter's liability for support of her mother, Grace v. Carpenter, 42 Cal.
App. 2d 301, 108 P. 2d 701 (1941).
" There is a division of opinion among law review writers as to the intention
of the legislature in passing the 1927 statute. One has significantly pointed out that
her local rights and remedies remain the same, Cahn, Federal Taxation and Pri-
vate Law, 44 CoLum. L. Rav. 669, 676 (1944), and the most recent writer is of the
opinion that perhaps the legislature intended only to permit the husband and wife
to file separate federal income tax returns without overturning previous statements
of the courts as to the nature of her interest, Marsh, California Family Law-A
Review, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 368, 373-374 (1954). See also: Hooker, Nature of
Wife's Interest in Community Property in California, 15 CALIF. L. REv. 302 (1927) ;
Horne, Community Property-A Functiornl Approach, 24 So. CALIF. L. REV. 42
(1950) ; Kirkwood, The Ownership of Comnunity Property in. California, 7 So.
CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1933) ; Simmons, The Interest of a Wife in California Commu-
nity Property, 22 CALIF. L. Ray. 404 (1934) ; Recent Legislation, 16 CALIF. L. REV.
63, 68 (1927) ; 23 So. CALIF. L. REV. 237 (1950).
"8 See note 13 supra.
2' CAL. PROBATE CODE ANN. § 201 (1956) ; Cook v. Spivey, 174 S. W. 2d 634
(Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
" CAL. REVENUE ANID TAXATION CODE ANN. § 15301 (Deering 1952) ; Jones v.
State, 5 S. W. 2d 973 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928).
" CAL. CIVIL CODE ANN. § 146 (West 1954) ; TEX. CIVIL STAT. ANN. art. 4638
(Vernon 1951).
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have the right to alienate, to encumber, or to manage or control her in-
terest during coverture.3 2  Only the husband has these rights.
8
On the other hand, the interest of the wife in each state are slightly
dissimilar in several respects. In California the wife must join in con-
veyances of community property for a period of more than one year.
84
In Texas the wife is not required to join in conveyances, and the husband
may convey in fraud of her interest, but his separate estate may become
liable to the community for her loss. 35 In California the wife's interest is
not liable for tort judgments against the wife, whereas in Texas it has
been held to be so liable.36 In Texas if the husband disappears for more
than one year, the wife by petition to the courts can obtain all the rights
which her husband exercised over the community property.3 7 This privi-
lege does not seem to exist in California, though perhaps somewhat the
same result is reached in the latter state when the wife obtains a division
of the property upon legal separation from the husband.38 Lastly, by re-
cent constitutional amendment, the husband and wife in Texas may
voluntarily partition the community property and hold their interests
separately thereafter.39 There is no express constitutional or statutory
authority for such a partion in California, but the husband and wife may
contract between themselves to hold their property separately.
40
Thus, it is seen that though Texas and California differ in labeling
the wife's interest, the rights of the wife in both states are substantially
the same, and that the variance in labeling could not be founded upon
any substantial differences between basic substantive rights of the wife in
each state. Furthermore, the reliance in the decisions upon the label of
"vested" does not seem to justify the differing consequences, and it
would therefore seem reasonable to conclude that the label is meaningless
32 CAL. CIVIL CODE ANN. §§ 172 and 172a (West 1954) ; TEX. CIVIL STAT. ANN.
arts. 4619 and 4621 (Vernon 1951). Under article 4619, it would seem that the
Texas wife cannot sell her interest, since only the husband is given a power of
disposal during coverture, and under article 4621 the community property is not
liable for debts or damage resulting from contracts of the wife; however, such
property is stated to be liable for necessaries furnished the wife or children. In
California, under section 174 of the Civil Code, the husband is liable for necessaries
furnished the wife or children.
Ibid.
, CAL. CIVIL CODE ANN. §§ 172 and 172a (West 1954).
"3 Graves v. Guaranty Bond State Bank, 161 S. W. 2d 118 (Tex. Civ. App.
1942): Rudasill v. Rudasill, 219 S. W. 843 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
"0 CAL. CIVIL CODE ANN. § 167 (West 1954) ; Patterson v. Frazer, 93 S. W. 146
(Tex. Civ. App. 1906).
3 TEX. CIVIL STAT. ANN. art. 4619 (Vernon 1951).
CAL. CIVIL CODE ANN. § 146 (West 1954).
TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 15 (Vernon 1955). See also TEX. CIVIL STAT. ANN.
art. 4624a (Vernon 1951).
40 See CAL. CIVIL CODE ANN. § 159 (West 1954) : "A husband and wife cannot,
by any contract with each other, alter their legal relations, except as to property.
(Emphasis added.) See Essick v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 23 (S. D. Cal.




as a criterion for determining the extent of the interest transferred when
community property passes from a-husband to his wife by gift or upon
his death.
It is evident from the rights of the wife detailed above that when
a husband transfers community property to his wife, she then for the
first time receives certain important property rights in her one-half in-
terest. Whether the transfer of those rights is so insignificant as not to
warrant taxation of course depends largely upon individual state taxing
policy.41 However, before the tax consequences are resolved, the extent
of the interest transferred should be determined and brought into a
proper perspective with the taxing policy. It is submitted that common
law states, when confronted with the problem of taxing transfers of com-
munity property from a husband to his wife, can more realistically ac-
complish this determination by analyzing the actual substantive rights
possessed by the wife before and after the transfer-and not by relying
upon the sometimes vague and meaningless label of "vested."
J. THOMAS MANN.
Real Property-Conveyances between Spouses-Creation and Dissolu-
tion of Estates by the Entirety
In North Carolina, a married woman can make a valid conveyance
to her husband of her real property' only if the instrument of conveyance
contains a certificate by the certifying officer of his findings of facts and
conclusions as to whether the deed is unreasonable or injurious to her.
2
The certificate is based on a private examination of the wife.
3
" New York, for example, has a specific estate tax statute (similar to the federal
statute in effect from 1942 to 1948) in regard to community property. It states
that the gross estate of a decedent shall include property "held as community
property by the decedent and surviving spouse under the law of any state . . . or
any foreign country, except such part thereof as may be shown to have been re-
ceived as compensation for personal services rendered by the surviving spouse or
derived originally from such compensation or from the separate property of the
surviving spouse. In no case shall such interest included . . . be less than the
value of the community property as was subject to the decendent's power of testa-
mentary disposition." N. Y. TAx LAW § 249-r (5-a). Where all the community
property passes to the wife upon the husband's death, it has been held, under this
statute, that the entire amount of property was includible in the husband's gross
estate. In re Walk's Estate, 192 N. Y. Misc. 237, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 645 (Surr. Ct.
1948).
' N. C. CoNsT. art. X, § 6. "The real and personal property of any female in
this State . . . may be devised and bequeathed, and, with the written consent of
her husband, conveyed by her as if she were unmarried." See also Perry v. Stancil,
237 N. C. 442, 75 S. E. 2d 512 (1953) (The wife conveyed her separate estate to
her husband without his written consent. The court held that art. X, § 6 of the
Constitution did not apply to the conveyance to the husband. The provision applies
only to conveyances to third parties.)
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 52-12(b) (1955).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 52-12 (a) (1955).
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